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Abstract 
 
This paper assumes a network dynamics perspective to explore the charitable sector 
campaign known as ‘Give it Back, George’, which overturned a threatening tax 
change announced in the UK Budget 2012. We consider network activity from 
diverse viewpoints. Collaboration by disparate players enhanced the campaign’s 
legitimacy, high-status actors with a tertius iungens strategic orientation eschewing 
the limelight whilst others took centre stage. Whilst extant research has shown how 
lower-status actors may profit from the networks of prominent individuals, we 
demonstrate that the reverse may apply. We suggest that elite actors who activate ties 
and bring together disconnected others are often less visible than apparent dominant 
actors. Social movements are not always reformist but may be deployed by elite 
incumbents to preserve the status quo. The story we narrate here is therefore less 
concerned with field transformation than with field preservation at the elite level 
when faced with threatening change. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper examines the dynamics of networked collective action in the philanthropic 
field (Castells, 2004; Castells, 2010; Juris, 2004; Kahler, 2009; Mizruchi, 2013). We 
explore the idea that dominant actors who catalyse change by activating ties and 
bringing disconnected actors together are often less visible than apparent dominant 
actors. The empirical setting is the charity tax campaign known as ‘Give it Back, 
George: Drop the Charity Tax’, orchestrated by philanthropic actors in the UK, 
designed to overturn a proposed cap on tax relief on charitable donations announced 
by British Chancellor George Osborne in his 2012 Budget. The immediate goal of the 
‘Give it Back, George’ campaign (henceforth GIBG) was to have the proposed 
‘charity tax’ reversed, maintaining the flow of funds to frontline charities. A 
 2 
secondary but important goal was to protect the collective reputation of wealthy 
philanthropists and their right to decide how taxes are spent on good causes. 
The GIBG campaign, which ran for two months from March to May 2012, 
was masterminded by a trio of network organizations: the National Council for 
Voluntary Organisations (NVCO), an umbrella organization which represents 
voluntary associations; the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF), designed to help people 
and businesses give more effectively to good causes; and the Philanthropy Review 
(PR), an independent organization with a membership of well-to-do individuals from 
the worlds of business and charity. The campaign swiftly snowballed. Endowed with 
a bespoke website, visual identity (a sketch of Osborne holding aloft his budget box), 
slogan, Twitter hashtag (#giveitbackgeorge), and amplified by daily stories in the 
press, it attracted widespread support from organizations, individuals and social 
media, whose diversity, institutional mix and united voice accorded it singular 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). The campaign ended 
abruptly on 31 May 2012 when Osborne capitulated, jettisoning his proposals for 
reform.  
The seemingly spontaneous coming together of individuals, organizations and 
networks as a broadly based social movement to resist and ultimately defeat game-
changing government proposals, provides a rich setting for the exploration and 
development of theoretical ideas relating to network emergence, orchestration and 
dynamics. Recent years have seen a marked expansion in the theoretical horizons, 
empirical concerns and methodological underpinnings of social network research 
(Borgatti, Brass & Halgin, 2014; Borgatti, Mehra, Brass & Labianca, 2009). The 
long-standing interest in network structures and the impact of differing network 
configurations on organizational performance remains central, as does the rich 
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conceptual apparatus that characterizes the field, but the research agenda has been 
expanded and new lines of enquiry opened up (Zaheer, Gözübüyük & Milanova, 
2010). Three developments have been influential in shaping this paper. The first is 
recognition of the importance of network dynamics to outcomes; of network 
activation, orchestration and deployment, and the role of contingencies in determining 
possibilities (Ahuja, Soda & Zaheer, 2012; Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2013; 
Sasovova, Mehra, Borgatti & Schippers, 2010). The second is a greater emphasis on 
agency within networks, ‘the agentic processes that help shape social networks over 
time’ (Sasovova et al., 2010, p.662); as well as on actor types, the roles played by 
individuals and organizations, and the exercise of power by playmakers (Brass & 
Burkhardt, 1993; Burkhardt & Brass, 1990; Burt, 2012; Gulati & Srivastava, 2014; 
Kahler, 2009; Obstfeld, 2005). The third is a greater understanding of contexts and 
processes bearing upon the functioning and evolution of networks; of history, 
temporality and decay (Borgatti et al., 2009; Castells, 2010; Kijkuit & van den Ende, 
2010; Kossinets & Watts, 2006; Mizruchi, 2013; Sasovova et al., 2010; Zaheer & 
Soda, 2009). This paper builds on these developments.  
Specifically, we address three research questions. The first concerns 
mobilization and momentum: when confronted with government power, how can 
social activism be mobilized around flexible alternative networks to resist change 
from above?  The second concerns agency and strategy: how do individual agents 
assume control of strategy and determine tactics, proactively and reactively, in pursuit 
of network objectives? The third concerns power and governance: how and in what 
circumstances might dominant agents assume control of erstwhile spontaneous, 
collectivist networks?  
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Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we survey the 
theoretical terrain to clarify and elaborate on debates surrounding network dynamics 
and social activism. We draw on Bourdieu’s (1993, 1996) notion of the ‘field of 
power’, which we define as an elite networking space for actors bent on setting or 
retuning institutional agendas. The following section is methodological, explaining 
our data sources and research methods. We then present an original reconstruction of 
the GIBG campaign based on multiple sources drawn from different vantage points. 
In our findings section, we consider actors, roles, network dynamics and the framing 
of logics of action in the GIBG campaign. Finally, we discuss our findings, consider 
their implications for the theory and practice of network dynamics in the philanthropic 
field, and reflect on the limitations of the study and potentialities for future research.  
 
Network Dynamics and Social Movements 
Castells (2004) regards networks as fundamental to human living. They are in his eyes 
the ‘new social morphology’ of our times (Castells, 2010, p.500). Networks provide 
both the conduits that channel resources and the lenses through which observers 
understand action (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008). Viewed in this light, networks are 
fundamental to fields characterized by specific logics of action; with the ‘situated and 
often improvised performances of highly bounded, but nonetheless purposive, 
organizational and individual agents’ having the potential over time to produce ‘a 
motor for evolution and change’ (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008, p.618). All social 
networks fall within the broad definition proposed by Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve and 
Tsai (2004, p.795) of ‘a set of nodes and the set of ties representing some relationship, 
or lack of relationship, between the nodes’. Nodes typically are organizations or 
individuals. Ties are bonds of association that imply a capacity for collective action. 
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  In this section, we introduce the main theoretical ideas employed to make 
sense of the GIBG campaign. Three distinctions underpin our theoretical position. 
First, we distinguish between dominant and subordinate actors (nodes) within 
networks (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). Dominant, higher-status actors have abundant 
economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital, according them ‘a disproportionate 
share of future ties’ (Zaheer & Soda, 2009, p.4) from which they derive ‘accumulative 
advantage’ (Powell, Koput, White & Owen-Smith, 2005, p.1140). Subordinate, lower-
status actors on the other hand do not, suggesting that the latter are dependent in some 
degree on the former (Simmel, 1971). Second, we distinguish between field-specific 
networks and networks within the field of power (Bourdieu, 1993; 1996). Field-
specific networks are composed of actors (nodes) sharing common characteristics and 
bound by common interests. In contrast, networks within the field of power are 
composed of elite actors drawn from diverse fields who make common cause in 
realizing or defending society-wide institutional arrangements. Finally, we distinguish 
between social movements and elite networks (Krinsky & Crossley, 2014). In social 
movements power is latent and broadly distributed, individuals united by common 
cause (Borgatti et al., 2009), whereas in elite networks power is normally more 
evident, concentrated and focused on specific objectives (Davis & Greve, 1997; 
Maclean, Harvey & Chia, 2010).  
Network topographies and actor types 
Social network research focuses attention on the relationships between actors rather 
than on the activities of isolated individuals, and emphasizes the importance of 
reciprocity, shared values and trust between actors as pre-conditions for network 
effectiveness (Josserand, 2004). In this tradition, board interlocks are often taken as 
prima facie evidence of a tie between two organizations or institutions (Burt, 1980; 
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Mizruchi, 1996; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988; Palmer, 1983; Palmer, Friedland & Singh, 
1986). Network diagrams are often used to plot the network of ties or connective 
topography between organizations (Davis, Yoo & Baker, 2003).  
 The structural approach to network analysis has given rise to numerous 
conceptual insights. One of the most important is that dominant actors within 
networks are the best connected, possessing the highest levels of social capital, 
serving as bridges across ‘structural holes’ to provide points of union between 
otherwise disconnected actors (Burt, 1992, 1997; Zaheer et al., 2010). The implication 
is that dominant focal ‘egos’ see the bigger picture whereas subordinate ‘alters’, 
lacking vital information, remain in positions of dependence, unaware of the full 
range of strategic choices available to them. Outcomes depend on circumstances and 
the strategic orientations of dominant actors. Zaheer and Soda (2009, p.4) argue that 
Burt’s (1992) notion of structural holes highlights ‘the entrepreneurial role of the 
network actor’. If a dominant actor chooses to play one subordinate actor off against 
another for private gain, adopting the so-called tertius gaudens (or ‘third who enjoys’) 
orientation, then bridging is an active source of individual competitive advantage 
(Simmel, 1902, pp.174-182). If, however, a dominant actor seeks to close structural 
holes in order to join alters together, sharing information to promote common 
purpose, pursuing the so-called tertius iungens (or ‘third who joins’) approach, a 
‘strategic orientation by which actors bring forth such combinations and 
recombinations’ of actors, then bridging becomes instead a source of collective 
competitive advantage (Obstfeld, 2005, p.104). When and under what circumstances a 
dominant actor assumes an individual or collective perspective and its corresponding 
strategic orientation is of considerable theoretical interest (Das & Teng, 2002). 
Dominant organizations can shift orientations depending on circumstances; assuming 
 7 
a tertius gaudens orientation in normal times when there is no threat to the field, and a 
tertius iungens orientation in exceptional times when the field as a whole may be 
under threat.  
Network dynamics 
Topographical analysis of social networks has been complemented in more recent 
times by research on network dynamics (Newman, Barabási & Watts, 2006). The 
notion that organizations are structurally embedded in networks is suggestive of 
stability, diverting attention from significant changes in ties and flows of power 
across networks over time (Davis et al., 2003; Sasovova et al., 2010). Brass et al. 
(2004, p.809) rightly discern a ‘shift from statics to dynamics’ (Ahuja et al., 2012; 
Newman et al., 2006; Powell et al., 2005; Sasovova et al., 2010; Smith, Menon & 
Thompson, 2012). Despite this growing interest, more attention needs to be accorded 
to their empirical observation in actual contexts and in real time (Gulati, 1995; 
McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook, 2001; Kahler, 2009). More account also needs to 
be taken of changing network states, moving away from the presumption that all ties 
are live and equally available, whereas it is more likely for subsets of ties to be 
activated periodically and for others to remain dormant for long periods prior to 
activation (Levin, Walter & Murnighan, 2011). Not all relationships are ‘wired’, but 
may retain latent potency, ready to be activated when the need arises (Smith et al., 
2012). Burt (1992, p.68) describes such ties as being ‘on hold, sleepers ready to 
wake’. The mushrooming of social networking and microblogging sites like Twitter 
and Facebook has dramatically amplified the power of individuals to leverage 
influence and connections.  
 It follows from these observations that networks, as changeable entities, do not 
exist independently of people and organizations, but instead are the product of agency 
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as actors respond strategically to environmental change (Lizardo & Pirkey, 2014).  
Networks might be activated, extended and directed in pursuit of particular goals. At 
other times they might be neglected or dissolved in response to changed 
circumstances. Research on network dynamics is thus focused on processes such as 
network churn (Sasovova et al., 2010), structural evolution (Zaheer & Soda, 2009) 
and orchestration (Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2013). Here our concern is with the 
rapid emergence, orchestration, mobilization and dissolution of a field-specific 
network alliance. We follow Paquin and Howard-Grenville (2013) in defining 
orchestration as ‘the process of assembling and developing an inter-organizational 
network’, and borrow from Smith et al. (2012, p.67) in defining mobilization as ‘the 
process of putting a network to use’. This coming together of field networks in 
response to a common threat highlights the importance of contingent events to 
network orchestration, and the significance of sensemaking narratives as framing 
mechanisms within alliances, helping to set aside differences and focus on shared 
objectives (Goffman, 1969; Johnston & Noakes, 2005). We propose that the success 
or failure of such alliances depends crucially on the ability of actors with a tertius 
iungens strategic orientation not only to activate, orchestrate and mobilize the 
combined network, but also when appropriate to extend their reach beyond the field to 
connect with high-status elite networks active within the field of power (Bourdieu, 
1993; 1996; Maclean et al., 2010; Maclean, Harvey & Kling, 2014; Obstfeld, 2005). 
Social movements and social networks 
The power and agency of a network, as Keck and Sikkink (1998, p.216) assert, 
‘usually cannot be reduced to the agency even of its leading members’. Complex 
networks serve as conduits for the transmission and reframing of ideas, the main 
currency for social change; the ‘sites of power [being] the people’s minds’ (Castells, 
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2004, p.425), hence the power of social movements in contemporary civil society (de 
Bakker, den Hond, King & Weber, 2013; Davis & Zald, 2005). Social movements, 
typified here by the reactionary (as opposed to progressive) GIBG campaign, are 
complex, underpinned by alliances of networks of varying types and degrees of 
formality (Diani, 2003a). We follow Diani (2011, p.226) in defining social 
movements as collective action ‘in which coordination takes place through informal 
networks between formally independent actors, who all identify … with a common 
cause’. With their roots ‘in the fundamental injustice of all societies’ (Castells, 2012, 
p.12), social movements are seen as ‘the producers of new values and goals around 
which the institutions of society are transformed’ (p.9). The apparent unity of purpose 
of diverse but networked coalitions of organizations and individuals is a profound 
source of legitimacy (McAdam, 1996; Snow & Bedford, 1992) and key to any 
challenger seeking ‘to force the sponsors of a [competing] legitimating frame to 
defend its underlying assumptions’ (Gamson, 1992, p.68). 
 Four findings from social movement research have had a bearing on our own 
theoretical stance. First, there is evidence to show that social movements gain 
momentum by exploiting pre-existing network organizations affiliated to a particular 
cause through what Passy (2003, pp.21-43) labels the socialization (securing 
commitment), structural-connection (providing opportunities to participate) and 
decision-shaping (framing arguments) functions. Second, while leadership within 
social movements often seems distributed or unobtrusive, there are often focal actors 
operating behind the scenes whose ‘location at the centre of practical and symbolic 
resources among movement organizations’ (Diani, 2003b, p.106) accords them 
singular influence in building alliances, meaning that they are best placed ‘to act as 
“representatives” of the movement in the broader public sphere’ (Diani, 2003b, 
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pp.117-118). Network dynamics within social movements are often opaque, making it 
difficult to identify the source of leadership and coordination (Krinsky & Crossley, 
2014); suggesting that actual leaders may not always be apparent. Third, in order to 
maintain network cohesion and build momentum, collective action frames, as 
interpretive schema, must be presented succinctly to focus attention ‘on what is 
relevant and important and away from extraneous items in the field of view’ (Noakes 
& Johnston, 2005, p.2). Finally, leading actors within social movements not only form 
ties with other members, but also with ‘resource-rich potential allies and 
representatives of the state’ (Krinsky & Crossley, 2014, p.6). Here we delve beneath 
the surface of the GIBG campaign to analyze how a social movement might be allied 
to the struggle of one section of the ruling elite (wealthy philanthropists) against 
another (government), as skilled dominant actors forge ties with more peripheral 
players in an effort to preserve the status quo. 
 
Methodology 
This study grew out of a related project on entrepreneurship and philanthropy which 
investigated large-scale individual and business giving in the UK and internationally, 
historically and in the present (Harvey, Maclean, Gordon & Shaw, 2011; Maclean, 
Harvey, Gordon & Shaw, 2015). We had observed that partnering was often critical to 
the scaling up of philanthropic ventures, arousing our interest in the processes 
involved in the formation of nexuses of actors engaged in charitable ventures (Ball, 
2008; Bjørkeng, Clegg & Pitsis, 2009). When the GIBG campaign ignited we found 
ourselves well placed to gain access to the network of ‘movers and shakers’ directing 
it within the philanthropic field. It quickly became apparent that actors across the field 
were in a state of agitation, freely voicing concerns on the Chancellor’s proposals and 
 11 
encouraging resistance. There was widespread fear that charitable giving would 
plummet should the cap on tax relief pass into law. Numerous organizations were 
quick to rally behind the campaign announced by NCVO and CAF. It was also clear 
that the largest charities and foundations, while supporting the NCVO-CAF initiative, 
also intended to act independently in defence of the status quo. 
 These observations led us to theorize about the speed and comprehensiveness 
of actor network activation within the philanthropic field, and to develop the 
conceptual model presented in Figure 1. At core are the nodal actors that joined forces 
to lead the GIBG campaign. Following Ball (2008), who points to the growing policy 
influence and ‘convening power’ of philanthropists (Lindsay, 2008, p.62), we define 
‘nodal actor’ as an organization (and its key protagonists) with a natural 
constituency, legitimate voice and convening power which assumes responsibility for 
promoting the interests of the field. Those who convene power, according to Brass et 
al. (2004, p.804), ‘include government agencies, foundations, and industry leaders 
who attempt to build networks among organizational actors’. Grouped around the 
triumvirate of nodal actors were their respective fields or ‘alliance constellations’ 
(Das & Teng, 2002; Gomes-Casseres, 1997), which we define as the set of 
organizations that look to a nodal actor for leadership, responding positively and 
supporting calls to action. This alliance constellation conforms to the ‘disconnected 
alters [that] seek out prominent and high-status teams’ identified by Zaheer and Soda 
(2009, p.26). Das and Teng (2002, p.448) remark that such alliance constellations 
may generate ‘a relatively deep sense of solidarity over time’; but also that they 
receive insufficient attention in the literature. Interacting with nodal actors, but 
remaining independent of them, are the large charities and foundations such as the 
Garfield Weston Foundation and Absolute Return for Kids (ARK). Such 
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organizations are less proactive than nodal actors, particularly in times of tranquillity; 
however when necessity arises, by virtue of their size and prominence, they take 
responsibility for defending the field as a whole. Acknowledging the role of guardian-
of-the-field they assume, we introduce here the notion of ‘sentinel actor’ to signify an 
organization (and its key representatives) which by virtue of its status and reputation 
plays a key role in defending the interests of the field.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
To research the dynamics of the GIBG campaign, we decided to explore 
actions, events and decisions from multiple network positions and perspectives 
(Knoke & Yang, 2008, pp.9-15). The narrative presented in the following section, 
which reconstructs the story of the campaign, how it took off, unfolded and reached 
its dénouement, is compiled from numerous interviews and textual sources. A key 
aspect of our methodology involved conducting in-depth interviews with agents from 
each of three network vantage points: nodal actor, alliance constellation and sentinel 
actor. The campaign was masterminded by a small number of key actors from the 
NCVO, CAF and PR spearheading the campaign, so large numbers of interviews from 
these were not feasible. We took the view that interviews from the three different 
types of actor should be evenly balanced. We therefore determined to locate six 
interviewees in each category who were close-to-the-action, including representatives 
from each of the trio of nodal organizations. The varying outlooks of actors on the 
drama hinged upon their individual positioning within the social topography of the 
field (Anheier, Gerhards & Romo, 1995; Borgatti et al., 2009). Accessing these 
contrastive views enabled us to build up a rich, multi-perspective picture of the 
network as a whole. Interviews lasted approximately 60-90 minutes and were digitally 
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recorded and transcribed. A list of participants is provided in Table 1, all informants 
being accorded pseudonyms to ensure anonymity. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
The documentary and textual sources we draw on to present our case analysis 
were gleaned from a variety of provenances, including the GIBG website, NVCO, 
CAF, PR, Third Sector, Civil Society, Community Foundation Network (CFN), 
Association of Chief Executives of Voluntary Organisations (ACEVO), social media 
(Twitter) and press releases. Despite the plurivocal, multi-faceted nature of our 
perspective acquired through access to different types of actor occupying varying 
positions in the network topography, our narrative necessarily entails ‘processes of 
interpretation and meaning production whereby [we] reflect on and interpret 
phenomena and produce intersubjective accounts’ (Brown, 2005, p.1581).  
 
The ‘Give it Back, George’ Campaign 
Context matters in networks dynamics (Clegg, Pitsis, Rura-Polley & Marosszeky, 
2002; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008). The political climate at the time of GIBG was 
dominated by the deepest economic recession since the Great Depression, marked by 
genuine austerity and severe cuts to public services. Much depended on how the 
campaign and its messages were to be framed (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005; Fiss & Zajac, 
2006; Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2013); navigating between competing logics at 
play in the philanthropic field allied to conflicting discourses in society-at-large 
(Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). 
On the one hand, the recession had focused attention on the role the better-off 
might play in regenerating communities (Dees, 2008). Public interest in philanthropy 
was on the rise (Acs & Phillips, 2002; Anheier & Leat, 2006; Dietlin, 2009; 
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Schervish, Coutsoukis & Lewis, 2005). According to this logic, philanthropists might 
step into the breach created by the withdrawal of public funding in accordance with 
Prime Minister (PM) Cameron’s much vaunted Big Society, which sought to 
empower local communities and nurture a spirit of volunteering (Cameron, 2010; 
Maclean, Harvey & Gordon, 2013; Rowson, Kálmán Mezey & Norman, 2012). The 
perceived opportunity was to foster a new culture of giving (HM Government 2010; 
2011; 2012) such that philanthropic efforts might be coordinated to generate a 
‘transformative capacity’ (Giddens, 1976, p.110). Both the necessity and potential 
existed for philanthropy to play a bigger role in society. Just 27% of higher-rate tax 
payers in the UK were estimated to donate to charity; those earning above £200K a 
year giving just £2 for every £1000 of earnings (Philanthropy Review, 2011). Former 
PM Tony Blair (Mail Online, 2013) claimed that philanthropy was needed ‘to lessen 
hostility to the rich’, seeing this as a superior alternative to state intervention in 
mitigating the adverse effects of rising inequalities. 
On the other hand, the presentation of the philanthropist as saviour collided 
with a new narrative that linked philanthropy directly with ‘tax dodging’ (Bishop & 
Green, 2008; Breeze, 2012). According to this logic, philanthropists were aiming to 
reduce their tax liability through the tax relief available for charitable giving via Gift 
Aid. HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) gauged the sum claimed by higher-rate 
taxpayers for charitable donations in 2010-11 at £350m. The proposed cap sought to 
address this by limiting tax relief to £50K or 25 per cent of a person’s income, 
whichever was greater, emulating a similar, albeit more generous cap introduced in 
the US. The strength of public sentiment over tax avoidance had escalated during the 
financial crisis. Companies like Google, Amazon and Starbucks were pilloried by the 
Public Accounts Committee for failing to pay tax on their UK earnings. Celebrities 
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who engaged in tax avoidance schemes (lawful but increasingly seen as immoral) 
were named and shamed in the media. Tax avoidance was no longer considered a 
‘victimless crime’ but as robbing the country of the means to fund its public service 
provision (Barford & Holt, 2013). Added to this were concerns over ‘hypothecation’, 
the notion of who should decide how taxes are spent. Rich philanthropists, so the 
argument went, should have no greater right to specify how their taxes should be 
allocated than ordinary citizens. The ability to choose which causes should benefit 
from their donations effectively gave them ‘another lever… to control the shape and 
delivery of public services’ (Walker, 2012, p.14). The association of philanthropists 
with money-grubbing bankers, widely blamed for ruining the country’s finances, 
might also encourage the general public to view the proposed cap in a positive light 
(Kerr & Robinson, 2011). 
There was thus much more at stake than the loss of income to Britain’s 
charities should the cap proceed. The balance of argument concerning philanthropy 
and the tax advantages enjoyed by the rich would likely swing away from those 
extolling the virtues of philanthropic choice towards those sceptical of the practical 
value of philanthropy as a means of achieving social goals. The Treasury proposal 
was read as a threat to philanthropic ideals and perceptions of donors in society 
(Brown & Jones, 2000; Goffman, 1969). The Chancellor’s parallel announcement of a 
reduction in the top rate of income tax from 50 to 45 per cent for annual incomes 
above £150K did not help the case for philanthropists retaining existing tax privileges 
(Walker, 2012). Cast in the light of defender of the rich, Chancellor Osborne was 
keen to prove this was not so. 
Network formation and mobilization 
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When Osborne dropped his bombshell in the House of Commons on Budget Day, 21 
March 2012, it took the charitable and voluntary sectors entirely off guard. The 
NVCO had assumed the practice over the years of gathering core staff around a 
television in anticipation of key announcements, but expected nothing of note that 
day. When, towards the end of his speech, the Chancellor revealed that a tax relief cap 
would be introduced, they were taken aback, concerned that the consequences for the 
sector would be severe. No sooner had Osborne sat down than the NCVO obtained 
the Budget document following its release, alighting upon the sole paragraph it 
contained pertaining to the cap – whose impact on the voluntary and charitable sectors 
they deemed to be far-reaching. 
Recognizing that this was a far bigger matter than NCVO could handle alone, 
within 30 minutes NCVO actors had contacted potential partners, of whom CAF, a 
regular ally, was first in line. The CEOs of CAF and NCVO, John Lowe and Sir 
Stuart Etherington, stepped forward to lead the campaign. Within 24 hours a website 
had been created and a name chosen for the campaign. ‘Give it Back’ was an early 
favourite, to which ‘George’ was appended – somewhat controversially, being rather 
personal, but the decision was taken to stick with it. The PR (2011), formed in 
December 2010 to celebrate philanthropy and encourage ‘more people to give and 
people to give more’, was horrified by what it saw as a blatant attack on its raison 
d’être. Invited by Sir Stuart Etherington, a board member, the PR joined forces with 
NCVO and CAF to form the nodal actor core to lead the campaign. While NCVO and 
CAF may be characterized as more left-leaning organizations, the PR comprised 
influential individuals, the tentacles of whose networks often spread deeply into 
Parliament and government.  
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That the GIBG campaign network was activated so speedily was partly due to 
the unexpected nature of the announcement and the perceived extent of the threat: UK 
charities were expected to lose £500m annually should the cap be imposed, 
tantamount to a 20% drop in giving. The PR had already mobilized its networks to 
boost philanthropic giving in the UK, having issued a ‘call to action’ the previous 
year. In this sense, its networks were already ‘premobilized’ and could be placed 
quickly on a war footing (Obstfeld, 2005, p.106). One interviewee in particular, 
Tristram, a PR board member and former investment banker, embraced a tertius 
iungens strategic orientation in bringing together disconnected alters (Obstfeld, 2005). 
Other interviewees spoke about him in this light, including Maurice who confirmed 
that Tristram had been instrumental in putting him in touch with high-level contacts:  
Now, Tristram was particularly smart because Tristram always kept an open 
dialogue with… you know, he is an old Etonian, he knows Nick Hurd 
[Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Charities, Social Enterprise and 
Volunteering] of old, he certainly knows Cameron… I think he’s a different 
generation and he was able to speak to them candidly and within about four or 
five days we had a meeting with David Gauke [Exchequer Secretary to the 
Treasury], Osborne’s press secretary, Eleanor Shawcross [Treasury special 
adviser], the guy whose name I can’t remember who is head of taxation 
policy, and so Tristram invited myself and A and I think B to go to that 
meeting. (Maurice, nodal actor) 
 
Of crucial importance was the framing of the debate given competing 
discourses among diverse audiences (Paquin & Howard-Grenville, 2013). NVCO and 
CAF felt that, with so many potential responses across the philanthropic field, if they 
spearheaded the campaign – by creating an alliance and steering group whose vision 
was broader than that of their separate organizations (Clegg et al., 2002) – they would 
be leading on an issue of direct importance to their respective memberships. The early 
days, according to insiders, were ‘quite crazy’, with the website up and running, 
hashtags defined, logos created, newsletters written, special advisers approached, and 
emails coming in thick and fast. Within 72 hours of its launch, support for the 
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campaign had swollen to over 1,000 organizations, ranging in diversity from major 
charities like Oxfam and Save the Children UK to minor associations such as the 
Blackpool Seasiders Childminding Group and We Make Jam.  
Initially the campaign was hampered by competition for air time and 
newspaper headlines generated by the proposed caravan and pasty taxes which also 
featured in the Budget. A turning-point came on 11th April 2012, when PM Cameron, 
speaking in Jakarta on a tour of the Far East, expressed the opinion that a cap was 
needed to prevent the tax system from being ‘abused’, suggesting that higher-rate 
taxpayers who gave to charity were practising tax avoidance:  
Some people have been using charities established in other countries to funnel 
money in and get their tax rates so they’re not paying 50p tax or even 45p tax 
but in some cases are paying 10 or 20 per cent tax. (Telegraph Online, 2012)  
 
The flames were fanned when David Gauke, Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury, 
insisted some charities did not do ‘a great amount of charitable work’ (Third Sector 
Online, 2012b); the inference being, to paraphrase Orwell (2013[1945]), that some 
charities were more charitable than other charities. The equation of charitable giving 
with tax avoidance, coupled with the hint that some charities were inherently suspect, 
was fortuitous, galvanizing the campaign. When the government refused to back 
down despite a lack of evidence, it enabled the steering committee to heighten the 
campaign’s profile and propel it further up the political agenda. 
Network orchestration 
The steering group of NCVO and CAF delegates first met about a week after the 
announcement. Daily phone calls between steering group members ensued, which 
became twice weekly as the campaign got underway, accompanied by weekly 
meetings. The division of labour between the three nodal actors was such that NCVO, 
with its large network within the voluntary sector, led on campaign support and dealt 
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with parliamentary affairs. CAF served as the public face of the network, researching 
the prospective impact of the cap on ‘hard pressed charities’ and feeding this to the 
media. The PR was instrumental in liaising with sentinel actors, concerned charities 
such as Cancer Research UK and the Muscular Dystrophy Campaign, bringing 
together disconnected actors and putting them in touch with the media to appear on 
programmes like Newsnight or Sky News; illustrating that ties centred on ‘the social 
fortress of one’s close, trusted friends’ (Smith et al., 2012, p.70) are crucial to 
coordination in a crisis (Brass et al., 2004; Krackhardt & Stern, 1988). Ostensibly, 
however, the PR remained at a discreet distance, eschewing the limelight while 
allowing CAF and the NCVO to assume overt co-leadership of the network. Too 
visible an intervention might prove counterproductive, running the risk that the 
philanthropists might appear as rich people upset that the government was bent on 
curbing their privileges. Philanthropists were therefore instructed to lobby their 
Member of Parliament (MP) and otherwise avoid the press. As Tristram explains: 
So, when the Chancellor announced this most unfortunate discussion around 
the taxation of gifts and suddenly we were all portrayed as blunt-nosed 
criminals, I made a decision on the spot… I rang [X] and [Y] and said, 
‘whatever people do, however many journalists ring you, you are not to 
comment and I’m not going to either.’ (Tristram, nodal actor) 
 
Maurice from the PR did likewise: 
I recall sending emails saying, ‘I think we could do ourselves more harm than 
good. It’s much better that the charity sector fronts this discussion because as 
soon as philanthropists do, it will always be attacked as rich people’s 
playthings.’ You know, people taking away their toys... So, we very much 
encouraged NCVO and CAF to lead the Give it Back,  George campaign and 
said to quite a number of philanthropists, ‘we recommend you stay out of the 
press if you can’. (Maurice, nodal actor) 
 
Further intelligence which the network received from senior government 
sources related to the genesis of the proposed cap. It seems the cap was a last-minute 
Liberal Democrat invention inserted into the Budget with little consultation. Having 
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rejected Liberal Democrat proposals for a ‘mansion tax’, Conservatives Cameron and 
Osborne had come under increasing pressure on the eve of Budget Day to concede 
some measure targeted at the wealthy – a ‘cap on allowances for rich people’, as one 
interviewee put it – to placate their Liberal Democrat Coalition partners. It was the 
eleventh-hour nature of this proposal, added to the fact that it came from the Liberal 
Democrats, which explains its unexpectedness for nodal actors with strong political 
connections, particularly with Conservatives. In the classic style of policy-making on 
the hoof, it appears the consequences for charities were entirely overlooked. Yet 
viewed as horse-trading on the part of the two government parties, any reversal of the 
decision would cause ructions for Conservatives Osborne and Cameron in their 
relationship with their Coalition partners, unless nodal actors could neutralize their 
arguments for the cap in the first place; hence the importance of reframing the debate. 
Thereafter, much of the steering group’s efforts were targeted at the heart of 
government. Lacking a direct entry route to the ‘quad’ (Cameron, Osborne, Deputy 
PM Nick Clegg, and Chief Secretary to the Treasury Danny Alexander), the NCVO 
and CAF performed detailed mapping of those connections they did have in senior 
government, including Cabinet Ministers, Cabinet Office officials and Treasury 
special advisers. They concentrated on Conservative backbenchers with direct links to 
the PM’s office (10 Downing Street), activating pre-existing links with the Treasury, 
the Departments for Communities and Local Government (CLG), Culture, Media and 
Sport (DCMS), Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), and the Department for Work 
and Pensions (DWP) to get their message across. A particular strength was found in 
the extensive number of weak ties possessed by board members of nodal actors, the 
more diffuse network structure of whose constellations proved ‘conducive to 
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collective action’ (Borgatti et al., 2009, p.894; Granovetter, 1973). At times such 
activities were taken to extreme lengths, as one interviewee explained:  
I think the most ridiculous one … was that we were contacted by a charity 
who said ‘we’ve got some very strong links with the Ambassador for Dubai 
who, by coincidence, is going to be spending six hours in a taxi with George 
Osborne this weekend’ and we said: ‘Right, great, get him on the phone and 
we will talk to him about what the arguments are and brief him, essentially, 
and if it comes up in conversation, not that this man is in any way going to 
give him the hard sell but just make his opinion known and have a nice 
conversation with George Osborne’. (Candice, nodal actor). 
 
Building momentum 
A constant stream of stories demonstrating the good achieved by philanthropists and 
the threat to giving posed by the government’s proposals were issued as press releases 
and filled the pages of the GIGB website and those of network members. Of the 
various broadsheet and red-top newspapers, the Telegraph, the Times, the Evening 
Standard and the Daily Mail proved the most receptive, none of which were 
conventional supporters of the left-leaning NCVO or CAF. Churches lent strong 
support, as did universities, who stood to lose donations from alumni. The message 
that the proposed tax reforms were dangerous and unjustified was reinforced 
systematically through direct lobbying of MPs, officials, advisors and government 
ministers. Encouragingly the message came back from sympathetic insiders that it 
was worth persisting, as the political leadership began to sense the dangers of 
changing the rules of the philanthropic game. 
The campaign peaked by weeks three or four, by which time it had achieved a 
significant media profile. On a human level, however, its organizers at CAF and 
NCVO were beginning to run out of steam and the campaign began to falter; likened 
by one member to ‘going through treacle’ (Candice, nodal actor). Keeping momentum 
going became an end in itself, with a contingency plan of campaign devised stretching 
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into 2013, while the government tried to close down the issue by promising a 
consultation. For a fortnight, the group privately contemplated a compromise, 
examining the impact of the cap if it were raised to 40% or 80% of an individual’s 
annual income; but took care not to disclose this publicly. Some parliamentarians 
urged them to do a deal; others insisted they should keep going. John Lowe and Sir 
Stuart Etherington were adamant they should stick to their guns. Having mustered 
such extensive support, they would be letting activists down if they were to broker a 
deal, so they persisted. Unlike CAF and the NCVO, the PR did have access to the 
heart of government. Towards the end of May, a small negotiating group of 
philanthropists was invited to meet Osborne personally. For ninety minutes, the 
conversation revolved around the spectrum of options available for a compromise. 
They emerged from the meeting feeling that they had been listened to, but with no 
idea as to what would happen next. 
Resolution 
The end, when it came, was swift. On 31st May 2012, one interviewee from the PR 
received a call from Eleanor Shawcross, a Treasury special adviser, to say the 
Chancellor was about to stand up in the House of Commons to announce a complete 
U-turn. CAF and the NCVO received similar calls. Osborne’s about-turn was worded 
as follows:  
It is clear from our conversations with charities that any kind of cap could 
damage donations and, as I said at the Budget, that’s not what we want at all. 
So we’ve listened. (Chancellor George Osborne, 31st May 2012) 
 
That the policy reversal was total came as a surprise, but there was no time to 
savour victory. Instead, campaign organizers had to get on the phone, write 
statements, alert supporters, draft press releases, and marshal activity. A new hashtag 
was devised (#thanksgeorge). Altogether, the GIBG website had elicited 45,584 
 23 
views, with the campaign attracting 3,821 mentions on Twitter. Six months later, CAF 
and NCVO were jointly awarded the Public Affairs News ‘Voluntary Sector 
Campaign of the Year’ award for 2012. The judging panel described the GIBG 
campaign as ‘one of the biggest coordinated campaigns across the voluntary sector in 
years’, utilizing ‘techniques of social and traditional media, research and lobbying in 
an innovative way to provoke unprecedented public debate about the benefits of 
philanthropy across many sectors of society’.  
Fligstein (2001, p.107) observes that at times ‘under some social conditions, 
the skilled performances of certain actors can be more pivotal than at others’. The 
entrepreneurial role of actors with a tertius iungens strategic orientation in the PR was 
kept firmly offstage while others ‘made the noise’ (Zaheer & Soda, 2009). Tristram 
remarks that ‘the only public statement I ever made… was to congratulate [Osborne] 
when he changed his mind’. Nevertheless, the PR felt it had been dealt a near-fatal 
blow by the Chancellor’s announcement from which, despite his volte-face, it was 
unable to recover. The campaign it had intended to run encouraging the rich to give 
more was stopped in its tracks. As Tristram explains: 
What it did do for us in the [Philanthropic] Review was it didn’t kill us stone 
dead but it was a pretty mortal wound. I mean, the timing was beastly. We’d 
just got everything lined up. We got all our recommendations clear. We were 
beginning to make headway. And then Bang! It came like a hammer. So, no, it 
was not a good moment. (Tristram, nodal actor) 
 
Actors, Roles and Network Dynamics 
Network dynamics in the philanthropic field 
It is important here to reinforce the point that partnering is a common practice within 
philanthropic circles. The objective of a given charitable project and the resources 
required to address it normally exceed the powers of any individual philanthropist or 
foundation. Even superwealthy foundations, like the Bill & Melinda Gates 
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Foundation, are wary of tackling such issues alone, and consequently seek partners 
with cognate interests, values and objectives. There are therefore ‘compelling motives 
to collaborate’ (Brass et al., 2004, p.804). In the mode of a tertius iungens strategic 
orientation (Obstfeld, 2005), Tristram enthuses about the partnerships the foundation 
he represents engages in: 
We love partnership. So, we work with people like Rag Foundation; we’ve 
worked with Henry Smith in Northern Ireland; we’ve worked with Rankin in 
the North East. We work with the Museums Foundation to work out which 
museums to support. So, we’re quite modest; we’re very low key and we’re 
very professional and from a governance point of view…we rely on our 27 
absolutely excellent colleagues to bring proposals to us. (Tristram, nodal 
actor) 
 
This propensity for partnering is accentuated by the fact that the 
philanthropists we interviewed were without exception highly networked individuals, 
often internationally so. This applied to their business ties as much as to their 
philanthropic networks. The social organization of giving represents a vital aspect of 
the benefits which accrue to philanthropists through their involvement in charitable 
works (Maclean et al., 2015). As Carole (nodal actor) explained: ‘It’s like high level 
networking really… What I do believe is collectively, we can do so much more than I 
can do individually’. 
If networking is inherent to philanthropic engagement beyond a certain level, 
it is not necessarily integral to the practice of giving voice to that experience through 
participation in a networked politics of philanthropy (Kahler, 2009). Philanthropists 
jealously guard their own privacy, as demonstrated by the PR’s decision to limit its 
visibility while other nodal actors provided the public face of the campaign. The PR 
had been conceived as a network, designed to encourage a ‘mass campaign that uses 
the power of peer networks and influencers to inspire others to give’ (Philanthropy 
Review, 2011, p.13). Now disbanded, having only been envisaged as temporary, its 
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main achievement, according to Maurice (nodal actor), lay in creating the network: 
‘We were able to marshal networks in a way we would not have been able to if we 
hadn’t all known each other through the Philanthropy Review’. The proposed charity 
tax and ensuing GIBG campaign brought philanthropists together in an innovative, 
dynamic network which had not previously existed, united in a spirited defence of 
philanthropic practice, believed to be in jeopardy: 
A number of new relationships between philanthropists were formed during 
this [GIBG] process and a number stepped forward to lead the public 
discourse. Their common interest in a favourable regime for giving, their 
passion for the causes they choose to support and the slight that they felt by 
being characterised as tax avoiders was evident. (Bowcock, 2012, p.3) 
 
Campaign stakes and message framing 
There is no doubt that the bolt from the blue delivered by Osborne on Budget Day, 
intimating that a cap on tax relief for charitable giving was in the offing, constituted a 
major threat to Britain’s charitable sector. At stake was Britain’s long-standing 
philanthropic heritage of around 180,000 registered charities facing combined annual 
losses of £500m., according to CAF calculations (Charity Commission, 2013; 
Philanthropy Review, 2011). The threat, however, loomed much larger than this, 
concerning the manner in which the future narrative on donations and donors was to 
be fashioned and written. Philanthropists were aghast at being depicted as ‘tax 
dodgers’ (Breeze, 2012). One interviewee, Geoffrey, summed up his irritation: 
There are two things that bother me. One is that it has been presented as a 
crackdown on tax avoidance scams, and that I find really insulting because I 
fundamentally believe that 99% of what people give is from the goodness of 
their hearts, not because they are trying to do anything naughty or 
reprehensible. But, the other is and this was actually… a Conservative junior 
minister who said this the other day: ‘It’s as if these people think they know 
better than government how to spend their money’. (Geoffrey, sentinel actor) 
 
Bowcock (2012, p.4) observes that such criticism of philanthropic giving 
betrays a misunderstanding of the facts, since ‘more than double the amount of tax 
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has to be given away to claim tax relief’. One nodal actor, Candice, concurs, stating: 
‘we’re always very keen to make sure we are setting the frame, the terms of reference 
of the debate… Nobody gets richer by giving away huge amounts of their money, 
essentially’. If however ‘all apparently disinterested actions conceal intentions to 
maximise a certain kind of profit’ (Bourdieu, 1998, p.90), then the ‘symbolic function 
of legitimation’ that philanthropy performs is called into question if it no longer 
attracts acclaim but opprobrium; incurring the risk that the damage done to 
philanthropy through its reframing as tax avoidance might affect the charitable sector 
for years to come.  
In casting aspersions on the morality of charitable giving, the government’s 
arguments ran counter to its own encouragement of philanthropy under the umbrella 
of the Big Society (Cameron, 2010; Rowson et al., 2012; Reay & Hinings, 2009). As 
Harpal Kumar, then CEO of Cancer Research UK, confirmed: ‘People who donate 
substantial gifts to charity are likely to be deterred by this new measure, which is 
completely at odds with the Government’s commitment to nurture a culture of giving’ 
(NCVO, 2012). Any policy expected to effect a 20% reduction in charitable giving 
was contrary to public interest. As Bourdieu (1998, pp.144-5) asserts, ‘it is also 
among the tasks of a politics of morality to work incessantly toward unveiling hidden 
differences between official theory and actual practice’. Network actors were 
therefore motivated to hold the government accountable to its own stated policies and 
professed beliefs. 
Actor roles and alliance constellations 
An analysis of the organizational networks of the three nodal actors in GIBG is 
presented in Table 2. This requires interpretation. The NCVO represents charities in 
England. Its board reflects its constituency and mission with members drawn from 
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medium- to large-sized grass-roots charities, like Macmillan Cancer Support and the 
Royal National Institution for Blind People. It is in effect a trade body that sets 
standards, provides training, conducts research, speaks publicly on behalf of the sector 
and lobbies government for advantageous changes in policy and regulations. 
However, the NCVO is not well connected at board level beyond the charitable 
sector, with its reach largely confined to the public sector, policy fora and the media. 
In contrast, CAF can be seen to be weakly networked at board level within the sector 
but extensively connected beyond it, with multiple high-level connections to the 
financial sector, including Barclays, HSBC and Deutsche Bank, public bodies, 
business services and the media. This reflects the status of CAF as banker and service 
provider to the sector with a large turnover and sizeable workforce. NCVO and CAF 
are connected at board level by the Chairman of NCVO, media celebrity and 
entrepreneur, Martyn Lewis. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 The third nodal actor within the GIBG campaign network, the PR, was 
connected at board level by NCVO CEO Sir Stuart Etherington. In effect, the PR was 
a readymade network partner for NCVO and CAF that greatly extended its reach and 
connectivity within and beyond the charitable sector. Its moving spirit, Sir Thomas 
Hughes-Hallett, had assembled a group that included some of the most highly 
connected individuals in British philanthropy. Many were major philanthropists in 
their own right and many others CEOs or board members of leading trusts, foundation 
and charities. A common characteristic of members of this ‘golden circle’ was that 
they not only operated at the highest levels within their chosen fields (finance, 
business, media and the law), but also connected to numerous influential 
organizations beyond them. Hence, the much higher order of network connectivity 
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recorded for board members of the PR, anchored within the field of power, compared 
to those of NCVO and CAF (Bourdieu, 1993; 1996). Members of the PR directly or 
indirectly connected GIBG with the UK’s biggest donors, prominent foundations, top 
City firms, government agencies, prestigious cultural institutions, powerful media 
organizations and, most important of all in this case, leading politicians. 
There is no doubt that the ostensible co-leadership of the GIBG by the 
charitable sector, CAF and NCVO, confirmed by their joint receipt of an award, 
accorded the GIBG campaign a moral legitimacy it would have lacked had it been 
orchestrated purely by wealthy philanthropists (Suchman, 1995). It was critical to the 
campaign’s success that it was not cast as a power play by the rich seeking to augment 
their own leverage (Kahler, 2009). The motivation attributable to the charity sector in 
directing the campaign was devoid of association with any possible private benefit, 
such as might be gained through legitimacy-seeking amongst diverse stakeholders 
(Burke, 1969; Mills, 1940; Saiia et al., 2003; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). One 
philanthropist compares the under-the-radar role played by the PR to that of a small 
trade union negotiating team engaged in talks with management behind closed doors, 
whilst those outside did the shouting: 
What that meant was there was a dialogue between the people in government 
who were saying ‘we’re not going to win this one’ and the sector but not the 
people who were making all the noise. So I equate it to the small trade union 
negotiating team that are inside the boardroom while all the shop stewards are 
outside standing round the braziers chanting. (Maurice, nodal actor) 
 
In terms of sentinel actors, whose role lies in defending the interests of the 
field as a whole, Geoffrey explains what it means to be one: 
As head of the foundation... it’s a little bit stressful if there is a regulatory 
issue going on, and we have that every now and then... Then, I and the 
secretary and any legal advisers have to go into bat… It will be back. 
Something will be back, some threat. And, I see my role… as being the sort of 
first line of defence for the rest of the organisations against external threats, 
whether they are regulatory or PR or whatever. (Geoffrey, sentinel actor) 
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Geoffrey conceives of his role as head of a large philanthropic foundation as being 
ready to ‘go into bat’ to defend it and the wider field whenever an external threat rears 
its head, watching over the interests of the field as a whole. This highlights the role of 
sentinel actors as being less politically active than nodal actors, yet serving as stalwart 
defenders of the field when called upon to do so. 
The GIBG campaign’s widening cast of participants as the campaign took off 
produced ‘new logics of affiliation’ (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008, p.610). The 
involvement of social media, eliciting spontaneous support from anonymous 
campaign backers drawn from the public-at-large, whose individual ties to the alliance 
constellation were loose but highly regarded in terms of the authenticity they 
afforded, enhanced the campaign’s legitimacy by strengthening its voice 
(Granovetter, 1973; Kahler, 2009; King, 2004).  
Thus, while nodal actors led the charge on behalf of the network, both overtly 
in the case of CAF and NVCO and more discreetly on the part of the PR, they were 
aided by sentinel actors whose individual actions and positioning in the field provided 
a useful defence of its interests. They were simultaneously backed by the wider 
legitimating field of myriad campaign supporters (see Figure 1). This collaboration of 
a broad array of diverse players was vital to the campaign’s moral leverage, 
legitimacy and ultimate success (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Owen-Smith & Powell, 
2008; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Suchman, 1995), enhancing its moral mobilizing power 
while drawing a convenient veil over behind-the-scenes intervention by nodal and 
sentinel actors. The outcome of this triangulation of network actors with their 
contrasting public-private roles was such that it served, temporarily at least, to unite 
the charitable sector, something that had never happened before. Maurice puts his 
finger on this when recounting a meeting between government and the small 
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negotiating group of philanthropists: ‘I remember the head of Red Cross standing up 
and saying, “Ministers, I’d really like to congratulate you because it’s the first time I 
have ever seen the charity sector agree on something!”’ 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The GIBG campaign illustrates the generative capacity of dynamic networks as 
channels of diffusion and potential transformation (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Institutional fields may be refashioned by collaborative agency accomplished through 
the coalescence and development of networks (Reay & Hinings, 2009). Network 
dynamics as revealed through the case involve status-differentiated social actors ‘of 
variable geometry’ whose collaboration was crucial to success, each nodal 
organization having to reach beyond its natural constituency to ally itself with other 
players (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008; Pitsis, Clegg, Marosszeky & Rura-Polley, 
2003). Their networked collective action assumed a runaway momentum, seemingly 
indicative of the pre-eminence of contemporary social network flows over more 
traditional sources of power (Castells, 2010). Closer inspection, however, reveals that 
behind the braziers, away from the tweets and the ‘madding crowd’, the three 
powerful actors were able to make their voice heard through more conventional 
means of interlocks and lobbying activities; and ultimately through elite intervention 
within the field of power, determined by their ‘positions in the prior social structure’ 
(Zaheer & Soda, 2009, p.25). High-status actors within the PR with links to senior 
government members played a critical role in stage-managing the movement’s 
development. The tertius iungens strategic orientation assumed by PR leaders entailed 
consummate social skill. Entrepreneurs are present not only in business but also in 
political and social life, as Fligstein (2001, p.107) observes: ‘some actors are more 
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socially skilful in getting others to cooperate, maneuvering around more powerful 
actors, and generally knowing how to build political coalitions in life’. Hence 
according to Obstfeld (2005), a tertius iungens strategic orientation contains the seeds 
of potential collective action. By adopting the practices of network entrepreneurs, the 
individuals directing the GIBG campaign accessed diversity and fostered a context 
conducive to their network objectives (Zaheer & Soda, 2009). 
 Analysis of the GIBG case ‘invites the observer to look below the official 
stories and representations that movements and their activists make and discover 
hidden dynamics and relations’ (Krinsky & Crossley, 2013, p.1). Privileged access to 
some of its leading protagonists enabled us to discern the ‘hidden transcript’ behind 
the public narrative (Scott, 1990). This reveals that like CAF and NCVO who fronted 
the campaign and won the award, ‘those people designated as leaders… are not 
necessarily the real leaders’ (Krinsky & Crossley, 2013, p.2). Our core insight in this 
paper is that while certain actors are needed to activate ties, galvanize change and 
bring together disconnected others, such actors are often less visible than ostensible 
dominant actors. In this regard, our study also teaches us about power relationships. 
Whilst extant research has demonstrated how ‘disconnected alters seek out prominent 
and high-status actors’ (Zaheer & Soda, 2009, p.26), our research shows that at times 
the reverse may apply, as dominant, focal actors consciously seek out disconnected, 
lower-status alters to reap the benefits of broader alliance constellations (Das & Teng, 
2002; Gomes-Casseres, 1997), which amplify the voices of focal actors while 
affording them a protective cloak of invisibility. Such ties are driven by nodal actors’ 
initiatives that are reciprocated and in the process legitimized by less prominent 
actors.  
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The case, more generally, suggests provisional answers to the three questions 
that have guided our research. First, in relation to resistance and momentum, the 
GIBG campaign network served as a motor for field-level change, resetting logics of 
action by spurring it to work together productively in defence of a perceived common 
threat, in a rare display of unity despite the status-differentiated nature of the field 
(Courpasson, Dany & Clegg, 2012; King, 2004; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008). 
Collaboration on the part of assortatively differentiated actors conferred a broad 
legitimacy which the campaign would have lacked had it been led purely by 
philanthropists (Sasovova et al., 2010), ‘universalization being the strategy of 
legitimation par excellence’ (Bourdieu, 1998, p.143). The manner in which the debate 
was framed was crucial (Johnston & Noakes, 2005), power being ‘a function of an 
endless battle around cultural codes of society’ (Castells, 2004, p.425). The UK 
government’s clumsy framing of its message, which stated that ‘philanthropy is not 
welcome and needs to be cracked down upon’ (GIBG, 2012), was imbued with 
contradictory logics, portraying donors as tax avoiders just when the state was 
actively seeking to nurture a new culture of giving (King, 2004; Lounsbury, 2007; 
Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Reay & Hinings, 2002). The inconsistency of the 
government’s message, allied to its lack of unity in its defence, contrasted with the 
coherent unified logic promoted by the GIBG network. As Hughes-Hallett, then CEO 
of Marie Curie Cancer Care, expressed it, ‘It’s bad news for cancer, bad news for care 
at the end of life, bad news for support for the aged’ (GIBG, 2012). The GIBG 
campaign benefited from a message which was blessedly simple: the most vulnerable 
in society would pay a high price. 
Of course, the unified logic on the part of the GIBG network was not entirely 
unproblematic. The fact is that the sole occasion the British philanthropic field had 
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united, it had done so not to protect the poor but to defend the rich. This presented the 
field with a moral problem for the future, since the appearance of disinterestedness 
depends on ‘the sacrificing of individual interest to the general interest’ (Bourdieu, 
1998, p.142), which the network’s defence of the wealthy called into question.  
Second, in relation to strategy and leadership, we observe that the GIBG 
network benefited throughout from the rapid emergence of and pursuit of a simple but 
effective strategy: insistence in public that the proposed charity cap be dropped, while 
engaging in private with the Chancellor and his advisors to find a workable 
settlement, prepared to tolerate compromise whilst recommending that the best 
political course was wholesale abandonment following due consultation. 
Notwithstanding the dual nature of the campaign, public and private, both charitable 
sector and philanthropic leaders spoke with one voice, remaining united and on 
message throughout. This was a considerable achievement, since as is common in 
networks (Mehra, Smith, Dixon & Robertson, 2006), the leadership team was 
distributed, with both nodal and sentinel actor leaders meeting behind the scenes with 
government officials and political leaders. The topography of the network, allying at 
its core the two main organizations of the UK charitable sector with a powerful group 
of highly networked philanthropists, played out in the assignment of campaign 
responsibilities, NCVO and CAF leading in public and the PR with the support of a 
group of sentinel actors leading discreetly in private. Thus the philanthropic interest, 
whose fiscal privileges the Chancellor had sought to curb, found itself out of the 
limelight but sheltered within the corridors of power. Here the representatives of the 
wealthy could speak directly with advisors and decision makers about alternative 
scenarios and their likely consequences. Yet far from being seen as special pleading, 
they were positioned at the negotiating table not as plutocrats but as legitimate, if 
 34 
unelected, representatives of a unified national movement, voicing the opinions of the 
common man in pursuit of common cause, a compelling rhetorical strategy 
(McAdam, 1996; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). 
Third, in relation to power and governance, we have shown that the lobbying 
power and political substance of philanthropic actors were clearly instrumental in 
Osborne’s eventual capitulation. The emphasis on connectivity as indiscernible flows 
whilst ignoring the actual specifics of network dynamics runs the risk of 
circumventing individual agency (Stalder, 2009). As Cowhey and Mueller (2009) 
remind us, the appearance of flatness may belie the hidden hierarchy at work in the 
network. We therefore take issue with Castells, whose conception of the network 
society typified by faceless flows of power leaves little room for an agentially 
effective power elite, such as we encountered during our research. Castells (2004, 
p.33) argues: 
There is no power elite… It is precisely because there is no power elite 
capable of keeping under its control the programming and switching 
operations of all the important networks that more subtle, complex and 
negotiated systems of power enforcement have to be established.  
 
We consider it erroneous to suggest that in a networked society the power elite has 
somehow vanished or forfeited its power. The philanthropists involved in GIBG were 
acutely conscious of the need to maintain a low profile to avoid delegitimizing the 
campaign (Townley, 2002). But this does not invalidate their status and agency as 
high-level social actors assuming a tertius iungens strategic orientation to deploy their 
networks, albeit under the radar and backed up by field-level noise (Obstfeld, 2005). 
Viewed in this light, the GIBG campaign emerges as a story of elite alliances and 
power legitimation concerned with field preservation at the elite level. 
With respect to each of these three aspects of networks research – mobilization 
and momentum, strategy and structure, power and governance  – our research is 
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suggestive rather than conclusive, limited by its focus on a single case study and 
organizational field (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Siggelkow, 
2007). We suggest nevertheless that GIBG comprises a unique empirical case. Whilst 
compared to other social movements, it may appear small-scale and short-lived, this 
has enabled us to study it as a whole, from beginning to end. Having privileged access 
to GIBG actors occupying differing positions in the network topography whose 
activity was key to its dénouement allowed us to access ‘hidden transcripts’, sparking 
insights which might have been lacking in a more broadly-based comparative study 
(Scott, 1990). This has enabled us to elaborate the role of dominant nodal actors with 
direct links to power who, at times, may seek to obscure their connections in the field 
of power by widening their networks with loose, disconnected ties to better serve their 
interests (Bourdieu, 1996; Obstfeld, 2005; Smith et al., 2012). Future research might 
explore this further, in an era when relations between the state and its citizens are in 
the process of being redrawn and renegotiated.  
The nature of our research contribution is twofold. First, we add to literature 
that emphasizes the dynamic nature of social networks (Ahuja et al., 2012; Kahler, 
2009; Newman et al., 2006; Powell et al., 2005; Sasovova et al., 2010; Smith et al., 
2012). As elite incumbents in the philanthropic field fought to uphold the status quo 
and defeat game-changing government proposals, our study shines a light on the 
network dynamics at work in the process. Although some commentators like Castells 
(2004; 2010) focus their analyses on imperceptible ‘flows of power and wealth’ 
(Stalder, 2006, p.132), we examine the philanthropic field in action by taking account 
of the agents who bring their networks to life (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008). Without 
due regard to the network topography and the leaders who animate it, any study of 
network dynamics is arguably partial and incomplete (Stalder, 2006). We build on the 
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work of Obstfeld (2005) to elaborate the role of actors who assume a tertius iungens 
strategic orientation, enhancing understanding of what network orchestrators actually 
do ‘to frame the value of the network for diverse audiences’ (Paquin & Howard-
Grenville, 2013, p.1626). Whilst extant research has revealed how lower-status actors 
may seek to profit from the networks of higher-status actors (Paquin & Howard-
Grenville, 2013), we demonstrate that the reverse may also apply, showing that elite 
players with high-level contacts may likewise seek to benefit from the wider 
constellation (Das and Teng, 2002; Gomes-Casseres, 1997). Most importantly, in 
emphasizing that certain actors are needed to catalyse change by activating ties and 
bringing together disconnected actors, we suggest that such actors may often be less 
visible that apparent dominant actors. In the GIBG case, the media furore served as a 
convenient veil and decoy that concealed and distracted attention from the PR’s 
behind-the-scenes exploitation of its network of elite ties to subvert Osborne’s 
proposal, highlighting the importance of stage management in collective action 
(Goffman, 1969). 
Second, we add to the literature on social movements (Johnston & Noakes, 
2005; Krinsky & Crossley, 2014), particularly insofar as this overlaps with social 
network and field theories (Fligstein, 2001; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). There is a 
presupposition in the literature that social movements are inherently progressive. The 
GIBG case teaches us conversely that social movements are not always as reformist 
as they are often presumed to be, bound up with a ‘major redistribution of wealth 
and/or power’ as challengers seize political opportunities to drive change, but can be 
deployed by incumbents for reactionary purposes (McAdam, 1996, p.341; Tarrow, 
1998). This resonates with Fligstein’s (2001, p.118) work on field theory, which holds 
that in the face of a common threat, incumbents will tend to preserve the status quo 
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(Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). When such threats emanate from outside the field, as in 
the GIBG case, skilled dominant actors may seek to forge ties with more peripheral 
players in the field in order to maintain the status quo. Whereas we often read stories 
about minorities in social movement research – including racial, gender and religious 
minorities, see McAdam (1996) and Valocchi (2005) – that legitimate themselves 
within a field and successfully subvert the existing order, the GIBG case provides an 
interesting twist on this as we see an elite organization (the PR) forming ties to defend 
its interests vis-à-vis another powerful actor from outside the field (the government). 
Hence, the story we narrate here is not so much one of field transformation than one 
of field preservation at the elite level in the face of threatening change, even when 
such elites remain out of sight and at one remove from the apparent action. 
The primary outcome from the GIBG campaign, beyond overturning the 
proposed cap, was that the philanthropic field demonstrated its ability to unite, albeit 
temporarily. This transient union is itself an achievement. As Clegg et al. (2002, 
p.333) observe: ‘Creating an alliance of contractually committed organizational 
stakeholders is no mean accomplishment’. The disbanding of the network following 
the campaign’s successful conclusion does not preclude the possibility of its 
subsequent reactivation in response to new, as yet unspecified threats, suggesting that 
latency best describes its current status (Levin et al., 2011). Its brief coalescence 
changed the logic of the philanthropic field by demonstrating the possibility of 
collaboration, engendering as its legacy the prospect of future alliances (Reay & 
Hinings, 2009). This underlines the potential of network dynamics to reset logics of 
action that operate in a given field. 
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Table 1: Participants in UK Philanthropic Networks Research 
Pseudonym Actor Description Location in Network 
Anthony Businessman. Philanthropist. Established 
foundation. 
Sentinel actor 
Bradley Philanthropy professional. Nodal actor 
Candice Philanthropy professional. Nodal actor 
Carole Businesswoman. Philanthropist. Nodal actor constellation 
Dennis Businessman. Philanthropist. Established 
foundation. 
Nodal actor constellation 
Geoffrey Businessman. Philanthropist. Head of family 
foundation. 
Sentinel actor 
Hermione Businesswoman. Philanthropist. Co-
established family foundation. 
Sentinel actor 
Ike Businessman. Philanthropist. Established 
foundation. 
Nodal actor constellation 
Ingram Businessman. Philanthropist. Established 
corporate foundation. 
Sentinel actor 
Jennifer Philanthropist. Co-established family 
foundation. 
Sentinel actor 
Kevin Businessman. Philanthropist. Established 
foundation. 
Nodal actor constellation 
Maurice Businessman. Philanthropist. Co-Established 
family foundation. 
Nodal actor 
Murdoch Businessman. Philanthropist. Established 
foundation. 
Nodal actor constellation 
Peter Businessman. Philanthropist. Co-established 
foundation. 
Nodal actor constellation 
Ryan Philanthropy professional. Nodal actor 
Tristram Businessman. Philanthropist. Philanthropy 
professional. 
Nodal actor 
Troy Businessman. Philanthropist. Established 
foundation. 
Sentinel actor 
Vivian Businessman. Philanthropist Nodal actor 
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Table 2: Alliance Constellations and Reach of Nodal Actors 
 
Nodal Actor Alliance Constellation Charitable 
Network Reach* 
Extra-Charitable 
Network Reach** 
NCVO – 
National 
Council for 
Voluntary 
Organizations 
(CEO and 14 
Trustees) 
The umbrella body for English 
with 10,500+ members; using 
income to conduct research, 
provide information and advice, 
develop and propose policies, 
and campaigning. 
Board Interlocks 
= 20. 
Interlocks per 
capita = 1.33. 
 
Network Reach = 9. 
Positions per capita = 
0.6. 
Distribution: public 
sector (3); media (2); 
policy forums (2); 
business and 
professional services 
(1); cultural sector (1). 
CAF – 
Charities Aid 
Foundation 
(CEO and 
11Trustees) 
A provider of philanthropic 
services for charities, companies 
and individual donors; operating 
on a large scale in the UK and 
internationally with 500+ 
employees; assisting in 
fundraising (£448 million, 
2012/13), providing banking and 
financial services, including fund 
management (£2.9 billion, 30 
April 2013); also offers advice, 
conducts research, and engages 
in policy development and 
campaigning. 
Board Interlocks 
= 8. 
Interlocks per 
capita = 0.66. 
 
Network Reach = 18. 
Positions per capita = 
1.5. 
Distribution: financial 
sector (6); public 
bodies (5); business 
and professional 
services (3); media (3); 
cultural sector (1). 
. 
The 
Philanthropy 
Review (17 
Trustees) 
A small but well-connected UK 
policy and campaigning 
organization with just five 
employees; established by a 
group of philanthropic, business 
and third sector leaders to gather 
evidence and campaign for 
practical measures to build a 
stronger culture of philanthropy 
in the UK. The Philanthropy 
Review Charter and Call to 
Action was launched in June 
2011.  
Board Interlocks 
= 31. 
Interlocks per 
capita = 1.82. 
 
Network Reach = 32 
Positions per capita = 
1.88. 
Distribution: financial 
sector (8); public 
bodies (6); business 
and professional 
services (5); media (5); 
cultural Sector (4); 
policy forums (4). 
 
*Board interlocks in 2012 of nodal CEO and trustees with other philanthropic organizations. **Board 
memberships or senior executive positions held by nodal CEO and trustees in other types of 
organizations. 
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Figure 1: Network Model for ‘Give it Back, George’ 
 
 
 
 
 
Sentinel 
Actor A 
Sentinel 
Actor C 
Sentinel 
Actor N 
Sentinel 
Actor B 
Nodal Actor 
& PR 
Nodal Actor 
NCVO 
Nodal 
Actor CAF 
NCVO 
Constellation 
PR 
Constellation 
CAF 
Constellation 
